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Abstract— We present an analysis of a heuristic for abrupt
change detection of systems with bounded state variations. The
proposed analysis is based on the Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD) of a history matrix built from system observations. We
show that monitoring the largest singular value of the history
matrix can be used as a heuristic for detecting abrupt changes
in the system outputs. We provide sufficient detectability condi-
tions for the proposed heuristic. As an application, we consider
detecting malicious cyber data attacks on power systems and
test our proposed heuristic on the IEEE 39-bus testbed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault detection and supervisory control are essential to
ensure that a dynamical system is operating in normal
conditions. These monitoring mechanisms are of higher
importance for critical systems such as power systems. Any
propagation of faults in a power system may have severe
consequences in the electricity generation, transmission, or
distribution. To this end, Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems are designed for controlling
and monitoring different parts of a power grid. Traditionally,
within SCADA or other conventional supervisory control and
monitoring centers, the state of the system under study is
estimated at every sample time. The condition of the system
is then tested by monitoring a metric based on the estimated
state. An abrupt change in that metric is an indicator of the
occurrence of some malfunctioning in the system dynamics.
A. Designated Data Attacks
In power systems, as an example, changes of the system
dynamics have been traditionally considered as a result of
meter aging and malfunctioning, electrical breakdown, or
natural causes such as storm, lightening, etc. However, such
changes might be the result of a designated cyber data attack
to the system. In particular, with the emergence of smart grids
and its smart hardware and software components such as
smart meters, Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), intelligent
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control devices, etc., power systems (and other similar large-
scale dynamical systems) are more vulnerable to such mali-
cious data attacks. In fact, it has been recently shown that an
attacker can design attacks that do not appear in the detection
metrics and can pass conventional detection algorithms. Such
attacks, namely called unobservable attacks, require a careful
compromise of meter readings by the attacker. Altogether,
these have motivated a great amount of research to address
cyber data attack detection within smart grids.
B. Related Work
Recently, Liu et al. [1] considered scenarios in which an
attacker designs attacks carefully such that the conventional
bad data detection algorithms are not capable of detecting
them. Inspired by their work, many other papers targeted this
problem [1]–[9]. An adversary attack has an impact on the
real-time and day-ahead electricity markets. Such situations
have been studied by [10], [11], among others.
Kosut et al. [5] assume a Bayesian model on the state
variables and consider a binary detection problem. In partic-
ular, they assume that the state variables have a zero-mean
Gaussian distribution. Fawzi et al. [2] impose a linear state-
space representation on the power system state evolution
and propose a decoder that corrects for the compromised
meters. In their plant model, they assume they know the
state transition and measurement matrices.
C. Main Contributions
In this paper, we assume no a-priori distribution on the
attack vector. We assume that the state variations (under
normal conditions) are unknown but bounded within an `2-
norm. The time of attack (modeled as an abrupt change added
to the unknown systems dynamics under normal conditions)
and its magnitude is unknown to us as well. We present a
heuristic for detecting such changes. The proposed heuristic
is based on the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of a
history matrix built form system observations. We show that
monitoring the largest singular value of the history matrix is
a good heuristic for detecting abrupt changes in the system
outputs. In particular, we provide sufficient detectability
conditions for the proposed heuristic. While the results of
this paper can be applied to any system with a similar linear
model with bounded state variations and generic faults, of
our particular interest are power systems and unobservable
attacks where such fault detection schemes play an important
role in maintaining the safety and stability of the system.
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D. Notation
A column vector is shown as x ∈ RN with boldface
letters. An element of a vector is shown as x(i). A matrix
is shown with a capital letter as A ∈ RM×N . The elements
of a matrix is shown as A(i, j). The transpose and pseudo-
inverse of A are denoted by AT and A†, respectively. All
variables are real-valued unless mentioned otherwise.
II. SETUP
While the proposed analysis can be applied to any system
with a linear model, we present our problem formulation
based on the DC power flow model of a power system and
a transmission network.
A. Measurement Model
Let yt ∈ RM contain the injected power measurements of
n+ 1 buses and line power measurements of m branches of
a transmission network at time t, where M := m + n + 1.
Under a DC power flow model assumption over a finite time
interval t = ti, . . . , tf , one can consider a linear relation
between the measurements yt and the power systems state
vector xt ∈ RN as:
yt = Hxt + et, t = ti, . . . , tf , (1)
where xt ∈ RN is the state of the system at time t
containing the relative bus phase angles1 and et contains the
measurement noise. The matrix H relates the state variables
and the meter measurements and in general, is affected by
the grid topology and link impedances. It is the job of the
control center to construct H . In this paper, we assume H
is given and fixed over time and both the attacker and the
control center have access to it. We assume the measurement
noise is Gaussian with et ∼ N (0,Λ). In order to incorporate
the attack in the model, one can extend (1) as:
yt = Hxt − θta + et, t = ti, . . . , tf , (2)
where a is the attack vector and θt is an indicator variable.
B. Attack Model
The attacker abruptly changes the meter readings at time
t = ta where ta is the time of attack. The indicator variable
θt is defined as:
θt =
{
0, t < ta,
1, t ≥ ta. (3)
Remark 1: In a more general setting, one can consider an
arbitrary function s(t, tai , taf ) as the signature of the attack
where tai is when an attack starts and taf is when an attack
reaches its final value. Apparently, there exists a trade-off for
the attacker between the detectability of the attack (in this
case, function s should be smooth and gradually increasing
rather than a step function) and the harmfulness of the attack
(a step function has a larger harmful impact). 
1The key state variables in a power grid contain bus voltage magnitudes
and angles. However, in a DC power flow model the state variables are
usually the bus voltage angles only.
C. Systems with Bounded State Variations
In this paper, we are interested in linear systems whose
state variations are bounded within an `2-norm ball. For-
mally, we consider systems with
‖xt − xt0‖2 ≤ γ, (4)
for any t, t0 ∈ {ti, . . . , tf} and for some γ > 0.
III. STATE ESTIMATION
A. Before Attack
Let’s consider the attack model (2)-(3). Note that at any
given time t before the attack (i.e., ti ≤ t < ta), we have
yt = Hxt + et. A state estimate, x̂t, can be found by
minimizing the cost function associated with a Weighted
Least Squares (WLS) estimator as:
x̂t = argmin
xt
J(xt),
where
J(xt) := (yt −Hxt)TΛ−1(yt −Hxt).
It is trivial to find the minimizer of J(xt). We have
x̂t = Kyt, (5)
where
K := (HTΛ−1H)−1HTΛ−1. (6)
Substituting the measurement model yt = Hxt + et in (5),
x̂t = Kyt = KHxt +Ket = xt +Ket,
where we used the fact that KH = IN .
B. After the Attack
After the attack, we have yta := y
t + a = Hxt + et. A
WLS estimate of the state under the attack can be found as:
x̂ta = Ky
t
a = Ky
t +Ka
= x̂t + (HTΛ−1H)−1HTΛ−1a. (7)
There has been a recent interest in the so-called unobservable
malicious data attacks on the power system [1]. From (7),
one can see that if there exists a vector c ∈ RN such that
a = Hc,
then we have
x̂ta = x̂
t + c (8)
and consequently,
yta −Hx̂ta = yt −Hx̂t.
Thus, at each sample time t, if the residual rt := yt −Hx̂t
passes any detection metric (e.g., ‖yt−Hx̂t‖2), the residual
under attack rta := y
t
a −Hx̂ta would pass that criteria, and
consequently such an attack is unobservable from the view
point of the control center. To this end, such detection algo-
rithms are namely referred to as “bad” detection algorithms.
IV. ANALYSIS OF AN SVD-BASED HEURISTIC FOR
ABRUPT CHANGE DETECTION
In this section, we analyze an SVD-based heuristic which
can be used for abrupt change detection of systems with
bounded state variations. In our proposed approach, we
collect a trace of the measurements over a finite time window.
A. History Matrix ∆t
Given the measurements yt over a finite horizon of time, at
any given time t one can build a history matrix that contains
the changes of the measurements as:
∆t =

(yt − yt−1)T
(yt − yt−2)T
...
(yt − yt−w)T

T
∈ RM×w, (9)
where w is the size of the considered time window. Define
Et :=

et
T
et
T
...
et
T

T
∈ RM×w, Gt :=

−et−1T
−et−2T
...
−et−wT

T
∈ RM×w,
Xt :=

(xt − xt−1)T
(xt − xt−2)T
...
(xt − xt−w)T

T
∈ RN×w, and A :=

−aT
−aT
...
−aT

T
,
for any t. It is trivial to see that ∆t can be decomposed as
∆t = Et +Gt +HXt, (∀t < ta). (10)
At t = ta (i.e., when the attack happens),
∆ta = Eta +Gta +HXta +A. (11)
Similarly, at t = ta + 1, we have
∆ta+1 = Eta+1 +Gta+1 +HXta+1 +

0T
−aT
...
−aT

T
(12)
and for t ≥ ta + w,
∆t = Et +Gt +HXt, (t ≥ ta + w). (13)
Note that the structure of the history matrix for t ≥ ta + w
in (13) is similar to the one for t < ta given in (10).
B. Singular Value Analysis on ∆t
Based on the structure of ∆t and how it changes over time
(before and after the attack), one can consider a heuristic for
detecting abrupt changes in yt. While the rank of ∆t (the
number of non-zero singular values) does not change before
and after the attack, the distribution of the singular values of
∆t changes (due to the addition of a rank-1 matrix) after the
attack. In particular, there exists a large jump in the largest
singular value of the history matrix at the time of attack
and afterwards.2 In what follows, we monitor this jump and
provide bounds on its magnitude before and after the attack.
In particular, note that Eta and A are rank-1 matrices. Our
goal is to exploit such a structure (rank-1 structure of A and
Eta ) in evaluating the changes in the first singular value of
∆t. In order to keep the paper self-contained, we provide all
required lemmas and theorems in proving the main theorems.
Let σi(∆t) denote the ith singular value of ∆t. The
following theorems present probability tail bounds on σ1(∆t)
(the largest singular value of ∆t). The first theorem shows
that the largest singular value of ∆t is bounded from above
with exponentially high probability when t < ta.
Theorem 1: Let τ > 0 and  > 0. Consider a linear
system described by (2) and with bounded state variations
as described by (4). Let M be the number of measurements
and w be the window size. Assume a be an unknown attack
vector and et ∼ N (0, ν2). Let ∆t and Gt be defined as in
section IV-A. Then, for t < ta
P
{
σ1(∆
t) ≥ `} ≤ 2 exp (−τ2
2
) +
(
(1 + )e−
)M/2
,
where
` := ν
√
w
√
M(1 + ) + ν(
√
M +
√
w + τ) + γ
√
w‖H‖.
Proof: See Appendix.
The second theorem shows that σ1(∆ta) is bounded from
below with exponentially high probability.
Theorem 2: Let τ > 0 and  > 0. Consider a linear
system described by (2) and with bounded state variations as
described by (4). Let M be the number of measurements and
w be the window length. Assume a be an unknown attack
vector and et ∼ N (0, ν2). Assume ‖a‖2 ≥ ‖eta‖2. Let ∆ta
and Gta be defined as in section IV-A. Then,
P
{
σ1(∆
ta) ≤ u} ≤ 2 exp (−τ2
2
) +
(
(1 + )e−
)M/2
,
where
u =:
√
w‖a‖2 − `,
and ` is as defined in Theorem 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark 2: Theorems 1 and 2 provide probability tail
bounds on σ1(∆t) before and at the time of attack, respec-
tively. The results have a probabilistic notion with exponen-
tial bounds. When we say “with high probability” it refers to
such exponential behavior. With reasonable choices of τ and
 for a given M , the probability term 2 exp (− τ22 ) +
(
(1 +
)e−
)M/2
can be pushed to be very close to 0. 
Based on these results, a detection rule can be considered
as follows. For any given ` and u such that ` < u, if
σ1(∆
t) < ` for all ti ≤ t < ta and σ1(∆ta) > u, then
an attack has happened at time ta. Based on this detection
rule, we can derive the detection probability as follows.
2While it is still noticeable, this jump starts to decrease at later times
after the attack and vanishes at t = ta + w.
Theorem 3: Let τ > 0 and  > 0. Consider a linear
system described by (2) and with bounded state variations as
described by (4). Let M be the number of measurements and
w be the window length. Assume a be an unknown attack
vector and et ∼ N (0, ν2). Let ` and u be as defined in
Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. Then, an attack a can be
detected at ta with detection probability
P {detection} ≥ 1− 2[2 exp (−τ2
2
) +
(
(1 + )e−
)M/2]
.
if
‖a‖2 > 2
[
ν
√
M(1+ +
1√
w
+
1√
M
+
τ√
M
√
w
)+γ‖H‖].
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark 3: Theorem 3 provides a sufficient condition on
‖a‖2 for detectability. The derived bound illustrates how
different factors affect the detectability. For example, the
larger the noise level (i.e., large ν value), the harder the
detection. The number of measurements M and the window
size w are also affecting the detectability. Detection of abrupt
changes in systems with smaller state variations (i.e., smaller
γ) is also easier as can be interpreted from this result. 
V. CASE STUDY - IEEE 39-BUS TESTBED
In this section, we examine our proposed heuristic and de-
tection condition on the IEEE 39-bus testbed [12]. Consider
a 4-sparse unobservable attack happening at ta = 129. Fig. 1
illustrates how σ1(∆t) evolves over time, where M = 85 and
w = 16. As an alternative to measurements, one could build
the history matrix based on the state estimates as given by
(5). To this end, we consider two cases. Once we construct
the history matrix based on the measurmenets (Fig. 1(a))
and once based on the state estimates (Fig.1(b)). As can be
seen, the jump in σ1(∆ta) is more distinguishable when the
history matrix is built based on the measurements. In all of
the simulations of this section, we assume γ = 0. However,
similar results can be achieved for the case with γ 6= 0.
Also, note that how σ1(∆t) starts to decrease at times
after the attack (i.e., t ≥ 129). In fact, this can be understood
by looking at the structure of ∆t at times after the attack.
As shown in (12), the first column of the change matrix is
zero at t = ta + 1. This makes the Frobenius norm (and
consequently `2-norm) of the history matrix smaller. This
decrease in σ1(∆t) continues on until t = ta + w. The
effect of the attack disappears for t ≥ ta + w when the
characteristics of ∆t are similar to the ones at t < ta.
Fig. 2 illustrates how tight are the probability tail bounds
of Theorems 1 and 2. As mentioned earlier, a 4-sparse
unobservable attack with ‖a‖2 = 2 has occurred at ta =
129. With a given number of measurements M = 85, we
choose τ = 4 and  = 0.75 to make the probability term
2 exp (− τ22 ) +
(
(1 + )e−
)M/2
= 6.7 × 10−4. We stick
to these values in all simulations provided in this section.
However, different values of τ and  can be chosen to achieve
a desired tail probability. A window size of w = 8 and a
noise level of ν = 0.01 are considered in Fig. 2(a). We repeat
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Fig. 1. Illustration of how σ1(∆t) changes over time when an attack
happens. In this example, an unobservable attack happens at t = 129. A
window size of w = 16 and a noise level with ν = 0.05 are considered. The
history matrix is built based on (a) measurements and (b) state estimates.
the simulations for 300 realizations at each sample time. A
window size of w = 64 and a noise level of ν = 0.04 are
considered in Fig. 2(b). As can be seen, the gap between the
provided bounds and the actual σ1(∆t) magnitude is larger
for cases with larger noise levels.
Fig. 3 shows how different parameters affect the de-
tectability condition proposed in Theorem 3. We first assume
‖a‖ = 2, M = 85, τ = 4, and  = 0.75, and we are
interested in the relation between window size w and noise
level ν such that the sufficient condition of Theorem 3 is
satisfied. Fig. 3(a) shows the result. As can be seen, for larger
values of ν, larger window sizes w should be considered
such that the attack can be detected with exponentially high
probability. In another scenario, we consider the case where
ν = 0.05, M = 85, τ = 4, and  = 0.75 are fixed and
we are interested in finding the relation between window
size w and ‖a‖2. Fig. 3(b) shows the result. For any ‖a‖2,
the curve determines the minimum required window size for
having detectability. For example, when ‖a‖2 = 2 one need
to construct the history matrix ∆t with w ≥ 22 such that the
sufficient detectability condition of Theorem 3 is satisfied. In
other words, attacks with larger magnitude may be detected
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the performance of the provided bounds of
Theorems 1 and 2. A 4-sparse unobservable attack with ‖a‖2 = 2 has
occurred at ta = 129. Plots depict 300 iterations at each sample time. (a)
A window size of w = 8 and a noise level of ν = 0.01 are considered. (b)
A window size of w = 64 and a noise level of ν = 0.04 are considered.
with smaller window sizes and similarly, one one needs to
increase the window size as ‖a‖2 gets smaller.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1 Considering the measurement model
given in (2), for t < ta (i.e., before the attack), we have
∆t = Gt + Et +HXt, (t < ta).
We are interested in showing that there exists an ` such that
P {σ1(∆t) ≥ `} is very small for ∀t < ta. We have
σ1(∆
t) = σ1(E
t +Gt +HXt)
≤ σ1(Et) + σ1(Gt) + σ1(HXt)
≤ √w‖et‖2 + σ1(Gt) + γ
√
w‖H‖, (14)
where we used the assumption that ‖xt−xt−t0‖ ≤ γ, for all
t and t0 ∈ {ti, . . . , tf}. Given ν, τ, ,M,w, and any t < ta,
let’s define event A as
E(A) := {σ1(Gt) < ν(√M +√w + τ)}
and event B as
E(B) := {‖et‖2 < ν√M(1 + )}.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. Illustration of how different parameters affect the detectability
condition of Theorem 3. (a) ‖a‖2 = 2 is fixed. One needs to increase w as
noise level ν increases. (b) ν = 0.05 is fixed. For any ‖a‖2, the curve
determines the minimum required window size for having detectability.
Attacks with larger magnitudes may be detected with smaller window sizes.
It is trivial to see that if events E(A) and E(B) happen, then
event C defined as
E(C) := {√w‖et‖2 + σ1(Gt) + γ√w‖H‖ < `}
happens where
` := ν
√
w
√
M(1 + ) + ν(
√
M +
√
w + τ) + γ
√
w‖H‖.
Using results from Concentration of Measure (CoM) phe-
nomenon of random processes [13]–[15], we first show that
for any t, random variables σ1(Gt) and ‖et‖2 are highly
concentrated around their expected value. The following
lemmas provide such CoM bounds.
Lemma 1: ( [15], [16, Lemma 2]) Let e be a vector in RM
whose entries are independent Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and ν2 variance. Then for every  ≥ 0,
P
{
‖e‖2 ≥ ν
√
M(1 + )
}
≤ ((1 + )e−)M/2.
Lemma 2: ( [17]) Let G be an M×w matrix whose entries
are independent Gaussian random variables with zero mean
and ν2 variance. Then for every τ ≥ 0,
P
{
σ1(G) ≥ ν(
√
M +
√
w + τ)
}
≤ 2 exp (−τ
2
2
).
Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, and noting that P {E(C)c} ≤
P {E(A)c}+P {E(B)c}, we have
P
{
σ1(∆
t) ≥ `} ≤ P{√w‖et‖2 + σ1(Gt) ≥ `}
≤ 2 exp (−τ
2
2
) +
(
(1 + )e−
)M/2
,
where we used (14) in showing the first inequality. 
Proof of Theorem 2 First we need a lower bound on
σ1(∆
ta). Modifying [18, Theorem 6], we can derive a lower
bound on the first singular value of ∆ta as
σ1(∆
ta) = σ1(E
ta +Gta +HXta +A)
≥ ∣∣σi(Eta +A)− σi(Gta +HXta)∣∣ (15)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ min{M,w}. In particular, for i = 1
σ1(∆
ta) ≥ ∣∣σ1(Eta +A)− σ1(Gta +HXta)∣∣. (16)
Assuming σ1(Eta +A) > σ1(Gta +HXta), we have
σ1(∆
ta) ≥ √w‖eta + a‖2 − σ1(Gta +HXta)
≥ √w‖eta + a‖2 − σ1(Gta)− γ
√
w‖H‖,
where we used the fact that σ1(Eta +A) =
√
w‖eta + a‖2
and σ1(Gta + HXta) ≤ σ1(Gta) + σ1(HXta). Assuming
‖a‖2 ≥ ‖eta‖2 and using the reverse triangle inequality,
‖eta + a‖2 ≥
∣∣‖a‖2 − ‖eta‖2∣∣ = ‖a‖2 − ‖eta‖2. (17)
Therefore, from (16)
σ1(∆
ta) ≥ √w‖eta + a‖2 − σ1(Gta)− γ
√
w‖H‖ (18)
≥ √w‖a‖2 −
√
w‖eta‖2 − σ1(Gta)− γ
√
w‖H‖.
Given ν, τ, ,M,w, and ta, let’s define event A as
E(A) := {σ1(Gta) < ν(√M +√w + τ)}
and event B as E(B) := {‖eta‖2 < ν√M(1 + )}. It is
trivial to see that if events E(A) and E(B) happen, then
event C defined as
E(C) := {√w‖a‖2−√w‖eta‖2−σ1(Gta)−γ√w‖H‖ > u}
happens where u :=
√
w‖a‖2 − ` and
` = ν
√
w
√
M(1 + ) + ν(
√
M +
√
w + τ) + γ
√
w‖H‖.
Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, and noting that P {E(C)c} ≤
P {E(A)c}+P {E(B)c}, we have
P
{
σ1(∆
ta) ≤ u} ≤
P
{√
w‖a‖2 −
√
w‖eta‖2 − σ1(Gta) ≤ u
}
≤ 2 exp (−τ
2
2
) +
(
(1 + )e−
)M/2
,
where we used (18) in showing the first inequality. 
Proof of Theorem 3 For any ` and u such that ` < u,
P {detection} = P{σ1(∆t) < ` and σ1(∆ta) > u} .
Using similar techniques as used in the proof of Theorems 1
and 2, we have
P {not detection} ≤ P{σ1(∆t) ≥ `}+P{σ1(∆ta) ≤ u}
≤ 2[2 exp (−τ2
2
) +
(
(1 + )e−
)M/2]
,
where ` and u are chosen as given in Theorems 1 and 2,
respectively. If
‖a‖2 > 2
[
ν
√
M(1++
1√
w
+
1√
M
+
τ√
M
√
w
)+γ‖H‖2
]
,
then ` < u and this completes the proof. 
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